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Abstract
This paper explores the relation between the quality of ￿nancial
institution and asset bubbles. In this paper, we will show that bubbles
can improve the macro performance even if the quality of ￿nancial in-
stitution is very poor and the ￿nancial market does not work well.
In this sense, the high quality of ￿nancial institution and bubbles are
substitutes. We will explore, however, that they are not perfect substi-
tutes. Bubbles may burst. If bubbles burst, the economic performance
must go down if the quality of ￿nancial institution is low. Hence, we
will show that not relaying on bubbles, but improving the quality of
￿nancial institution is important for long run macro performance.
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11 Introduction
This paper explores the relation between the quality of ￿nancial institution
and asset bubbles. It is now well-known that the quality of ￿nancial institu-
tion is important for macro economic performance, but it is not yet obvious
how bubbles a⁄ect the relation between the quality of ￿nancial institution
and economic performance. Do those bubbles may deter the macro perfor-
mance even when the quality of ￿nancial institution is better or do they
improve the macro performance even if the quality of ￿nancial institution is
relatively low? In this paper, we are going to show that bubbles can improve
the macro performance even if the quality of ￿nancial institution is very poor
and the ￿nancial market does not work well. In this sense, the high quality of
￿nancial institution and bubbles are substitutes. We will explore, however,
that they are not perfect substitutes. Bubbles may burst. If bubbles burst,
the economic performance must go down if the quality of ￿nancial institution
is low. Hence, we will show that not relaying on bubbles, but improving the
quality of ￿nancial institution is important for long run macro performance.
It is recognized that quality of ￿nancial institution is an important fac-
tor for macro economic performance. More theoretically speaking, if there
are asymmetric information problems or enforcement problems, the ￿nan-
cial market does not work well. If the quality of ￿nancial institution is low
and ￿nancial market is imperfect, the resource of this economy is not al-
located appropriately and macro performance must not work well. There
are many papers which treated this relation. For example, Pagano (1993),
Levine (1997) are the survey papers which examined this relation.
Those papers, however, do not examine the roles of asset bubbles explic-
itly. The purpose of this paper is to explore how asset bubbles work when the
￿nancial institution is poor. In order to capture the e⁄ects on bubbles ex-
plicitly, instead we assume an extreme situation in which credit market does
not work entirely. We will show that even if credit market does not work,
bubbles enhance the e¢ cient allocation and macro performance. Moreover,
the ine¢ ciency of credit market is crucial for the existence of bubbles. In
this paper, we use an in￿nite horizon model. It is well-known in the liter-
ature (Tirole:1995) that if ￿nancial market is perfect, bubbles cannot exist
in the model. There are several papers which examined how the ￿nancial
market conditions a⁄ect the existence conditions of (rational) asset bubbles.
For example, Kocherlakota (1992) has shown that bubbles can exist even in
an in￿nite horizon model if ￿nancial market condition is not working well.
2In other words, the low quality of ￿nancial institution is an enhancing factor
for the existence of asset bubbles1 Hence, our setting is consistent with those
papers.
The novel point of this paper is that we assume that there two types
of investment opportunity and not all agents have the same investment op-
portunity. Only some of the agents are able to access the high productive
investment opportunity and the other agents only have a chance to access
low productive investment opportunity. One crucial assumption of this pa-
per is that even if an agent does not face the high productive investment
opportunity at one time, she may have a chance to face the high investment
in the future. Hence, by purchasing bubbles instead of investing to the low
productive investment, the bubbles can be used to sell when she gets the high
investment opportunity. Presence of ￿nancial market imperfections, enough
resources cannot be transferred to those who have investment from those
who do not. As a result, underinvestment occurs. Bubbles help to transfer
resources between them.
From this result, we can interpret that such transitivity of investment
opportunity is important for the crowed-in e⁄ect of asset bubbles. if the
investment opportunity changes frequently, the existence of bubbles enhance
the macro performance. In this sense, we can say that the institutional
environment which realizes such transitivity is important for the positive
e⁄ects of bubbles2.
We also examine stochastic bubbles. In the case of stochastic bubbles,
bubbles burst at each period with some probabilities. We examine the ex-
istence condition of such stochastic bubbles and characterize the e⁄ects of
stochastic bubbles. We will show that if bubbles are stochastic, the crowed
in e⁄ect must be lower than the case of deterministic bubbles. The intuitive
reason is simple. If bubbles are stochastic and an agent faces a low productive
investment opportunity, she invests to both the low productive investment
and bubbles in order to hedge the risk of bubbles￿burst. Furthermore, we
will show that the burst of bubbles has a negative impact on the economy.
Hence, it is risky to relay on the asset bubbles for the appropriate transfer
1The possibility of bubbles in in￿nite horizon economies with borrowing constraints has
been recognized even in several previous papers, including Scheinkman and Weiss (1986),
Kocherlakota (1992), Santos and Woodford (1997), and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009).
2In this sense, our model is related to Matsuyama (2007, 2008), in which Matsuyama
shows that a better credit market might be more prone to ￿nancing what he calls bad
investments that do not have positive spillover e⁄ects on future generations.
3of resources. Improving the quality of ￿nancial institution is important for
long run macro performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the following subsection,
we present the literature in this ￿eld. In section 2, we present our basic
model and describe the economy without bubbles. In section 3, we introduce
bubbles to this economy. We examine the existence conditions of bubbles
and the e⁄ects of bubbles. In section 4, we examine the e⁄ects of stochastic
bubbles. We examine the e⁄ects of bubbles bursting and policies after the
burst. In section 6, we conclude our argument.
1.1 Related Work in the Literature
The conventional wisdom (Samuelson, 1958; Tirole, 1985) suggests that bub-
bles crowd investment out and lower output. In the traditional view, the
￿nancial market is perfect and all the savings in the economy ￿ ow to invest-
ment. In such a situation, once bubbles appear in the economy, they crowd
savings away from investment. Saint-Paul (1992), Grossman and Yanagawa
(1993), and King and Ferguson (1993) extend the Samuelson-Tirole model
to economies with endogenous growth, and show that bubbles reduce invest-
ment and retard long run economic growth.
Recently, some papers such as Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Kiy-
otaki and Moore (2008), Kocherlakota (2009), Farhi and Tirole (2010) de-
veloped a model with ￿nancial frictions, and showed that bubbles crowd
investment in and increase output as shown in this paper. Those papers,
however, do not treat the transitivity of investment opportunities.
In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), they mainly focused on capital
￿ ight and the international ￿nancial market works. In Kocherlakota (2009),
agents can borrow against bubbles in land prices. Thus, bubbles directly
enhance the ￿nancial imperfection in the Kocherlakota (2009). In the theory
by Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), since ￿at money (bubble) facilitates exchange
for its high liquidity, people hold money even though the rate of return on
it is low, that is money (bubble) works as a medium of exchange. In our
model, however, we focus on the role of bubbles as a store of value.
Martin and Ventura (2010) is closely related to our paper. They investi-
gated whether bubbles are expansionary or contractionary in an overlapping
generations framework, and have found that bubbles are expansionary under
a wide range of the parameter values of investment technology. In Martin
and Ventura (2010), however, new bubbles must be created at each period
4for the expansionary e⁄ect. This paper show such new creation of bubbles
is not necessary for the crowed in e⁄ect. Farhi and Tirole (2010) examined
the existence of bubbles and they found that bubbles can exist when the
pledgeability level is low, however, their main focus was the e⁄ects of outside
liquidity. Woodford(1990) has shown that government debt (bubble) crowds
investment in an endowment economy, while our model examine production
economy. In Woodford (1990), the entrepreneurs have investment opportu-
nities in alternating periods. This setup is related to our setting about the
transitivity of investment opportunities. Hence, our model can be seen as a
generalization of Woodford (1990).
2 The Model
Consider a discrete-time economy with two types of goods, consumption
goods and capital goods, and two types of a continuum of agents, entrepre-
neurs and workers. Let us start with the entrepreneurs, who are the central












where i is the index for each entrepreneur, and ci
t is the consumption of him at
date t. ￿ 2 (0;1) is the subjective discount factor, and E0 [x] is the expected
value of x conditional on information at date 0.
At each date, each entrepreneur meets high productive investment projects
(hereinafter H-projects) with probability p, and low productive investments










t(￿ 0) is the investment level at date t; and ki
t+1 is the capital pro-
duced at date t + 1. ￿i
t is the marginal productivity of investment at date
t. ￿i
t = ￿H if the entrepreneur has H-projects, and ￿i
t = ￿L if he has L-
projects. We assume that capital fully depreciates in one period. We also
3A similar setting is used in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Kiyotaki (1998), Kiyotaki
and Moore (2008), and Kocherlakota (2009). In Woodford (1990), the entrepreneurs have
investment opportunities in alternating periods.
5assume ￿H > ￿L. The probability p is exogenous, and independent across en-
trepreneurs and over time. At the beginning of each date t, the entrepreneur
knows his own type at date t, whether he has H-projects or L-projects. As-
suming that the initial population measure of each type of the entrepreneur
is one at date 0, the population measure of each type after date 1 is 2p and
2 ￿ 2p, respectively. We call the entrepreneurs with H-projects (L-projects)
"H-entrepreneurs" ("L-entrepreneurs").
In the present paper, to emphasize the role of bubbles in transferring
resources, we assume that a credit market is completely shut down. This
implies that it is impossible to transfer resources between agents through
the credit market. However, as we will show later, bubbles make it possible
to transfer resources between agents, even if the credit market is completely
closed. To show this point clearly, we make the extreme assumption.4








where qt is the relative price of capital to consumption goods. The left
hand side of (3) is expenditure on consumption and investment. The right
hand side is ￿nancing which comes from the returns from investment in the
previous period. We de￿ne the net worth (wealth) of the entrepreneur in the
bubbleless economy as ei
t ￿ qtki
t.
Now, let￿ s turn to workers. In this economy, there are workers with a
unit measure. Each worker has the same expected discounted utility as the
entrepreneur shown in equation (1). Each worker is endowed with one unit of
labor force at each period, which is supplied inelastically in a labor market,
and earns the wage rate, wt:
The worker￿ s ￿ ow of funds constraint is given by
ct = wt: (4)
That is, each worker consumes the wage rate at each period.
In this economy, there are competitive ￿rms which produce consumption
goods using capital and labor.5 The aggregate production function follows
4Of course, this assumption can be relaxed to allow the agents to borrow as long as
debts are secured by collateral. For example, we can consider the situation that creditors
can seize some fraction of entrepreneurial capital. That faction can be a collateral in
borrowing.






where Kt and Nt are the aggregate capital stock and labor input at date t:
Yt is the aggregate output at date t:




t and wt = (1 ￿ ￿)K
￿
t : (5)
We see that the relative price of capital to consumption goods is a de-
creasing function of the aggregate capital stock, and the wage rate is an
increasing function of it.
2.1 Equilibrium
Let us denote the aggregate consumption of H-and L-entrepreneurs, and
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t ; where Ht







t be the aggregate investment of each
type. Then, the market clearing condition for goods, and the market clearing











t = Yt; (6)
Nt = 1: (7)















t=0, such that (i) the
market clearing conditions, (6) and (7), are satis￿ed, and (ii) each worker
chooses consumption to maximize his expected discounted utility (1) under
the constraint (4), and (iii) each entrepreneur chooses consumption, invest-
ment, and capital to maximize his expected discounted utility (1) under the
constraints (2), and (3).
We are now in a position to characterize the equilibrium behaviour of the
entrepreneurs. As is well-known, since the utility function is log-linear, each
entrepreneur consumes a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the net worth at every period,
￿rm is zero in equilibrium, the ￿ ow of funds constraint of the workers does not change,
and is the same as (4).
7that is, ci
t = (1 ￿ ￿)ei
t.6 Then, from the ￿ ow of funds constraint, (3), the






Since the credit market is shut down, each entrepreneur is forced to self-
￿nance his projects.
Now we consider the aggregate economy. Since the investment function
of the entrepreneur is a linear function of the net worth, we can aggregate




















t are the aggregate net worth
(wealth) of H-entrepreneurs and L-entrepreneurs at date t; respectively.








The ￿rst and the second term of (8) represent the capital stock produced
by H-and L-entrepreneurs at date t + 1, respectively.
The movement of the aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs evolves









t￿1 = pqtKt; (9)
where qtKt is the aggregate wealth of the entrepreneurs. The ￿rst term of
(9) represents the aggregate net worth of the entrepreneurs who continue to
have H-projects from the previous period (we call these H-H entrepreneurs).
The second term represents the aggregate net worth of the entrepreneurs
who switch from the state with L-projects to the state with H-projects (we
call these L-H entrepreneurs). Since every entrepreneur has the same op-
portunity to invest in H-projects at each period, the aggregate net worth
of H-entrepreneurs at date t is a fraction p of the aggregate wealth of the
entrepreneurs at date t:
6See, for example, chapter 1.7 of Sargent (1988).




t = (1 ￿ p)qt￿
H￿E
H
t￿1 + (1 ￿ p)qt￿
L￿E
L
t￿1 = (1 ￿ p)qtKt: (10)
We see that a fraction 1￿p of the aggregate wealth of the entrepreneurs
is the aggregate net worth of L-entrepreneurs at date t:








where ￿qtKt is the aggregate savings of the entrepreneurs. We see that a
fraction p of them ￿ ows to H-projects, while a fraction 1 ￿ p of them ￿ ows
to L-projects.
By using the relation qt = ￿K
￿￿1










Given the initial value of K0; this economy converges to a steady state. In
the steady-state equilibrium, the aggregate capital stock, the relative price












[￿Hp + ￿L(1 ￿ p)]￿
;









In this economy, since the credit market is completely shut down, L-
entrepreneurs cannot lend their savings to H-entrepreneurs and end up with
investing all of their savings in their own projects with low returns. Resource
allocation is ine¢ cient. As a result, the aggregate capital stock and the wage
rate become low, and they are indeed lower than that under the perfect credit
market, where all the savings in the economy ￿ ow to H-projects.
93 Existence of Asset Bubbles
Now we describe the economy with asset bubbles (we call this a "bubble
economy"). We de￿ne bubble assets as the assets that produce no real return,
i.e., the fundamental value of the assets is zero. Let xi
t be the level of bubble
assets purchased by type i entrepreneur at date t, and let Pt be the per unit
price of bubble assets at date t in terms of consumption goods. In the bubble
economy, each entrepreneur faces the following two constraints: ￿ ow of funds














t ￿ 0; (13)
where ￿ represents the case of the bubble economy. Both sides of (12) include
bubble assets. Ptxi
t￿1 in the right hand side is the sales of the bubble assets,
and Ptxi
t in the left hand side is the new purchase of them. We de￿ne the














The worker also faces the short sale constraint:
xt ￿ 0: (15)




















t=0 ; such that
(i) each entrepreneur chooses the levels of consumption, investment, capital,
and bubble assets to maximize the expected discounted utility (1) subject to
(12), and (13), (ii) each worker chooses the levels of consumption, and bubble
7We should add a few remarks about the short-sale constraint (18). As Kocherlakota
(1992) has shown, the short-sale constraint is important for the existence of bubbles in
deterministic economies with a ￿nite number of in￿nitely lived agents. Without the con-
straint, bubbles always represent an arbitrage opportunity for an in￿nitely lived agent; he
can gain by permanently reducing his holdings of the asset. However, it is well known
that in such economies, equilibria can only exist if agents are constrained not to engage
in Ponzi schemes. Kocherlakota (1992) has demonstrated that the short-sale constraint
is one of no-Ponzi-game conditions and hence, it can support bubbles by eliminating the
agent￿ s ability to permanently reduce his holdings of the asset. See Kocherlakota (1992)
for details.
10assets to maximize the expected discounted utility (1) subject to (14), and
(15), and (iii) the markets for goods, labor, and bubbles all clear.
Now, we are in a position to characterize the equilibrium behaviour of the
entrepreneurs and the workers in the bubble economy. Here we use a method
of guess and verify. We consider the case where the equilibrium rate of return
on bubbles is strictly lower than the rate of return on H-projects, that is,
L-entrepreneurs purchase bubbles, and the short sale constraint is binding
for H-entrepreneurs and the workers. Since the entrepreneur consumes a
fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the net worth at every period, the investment function of






where i 2 Ht; e￿i
t = Ptxi
t￿1 for L-H entrepreneurs, and e￿i
t = qtk￿i
t for H-H
entrepreneurs. For L-H entrepreneurs, since they purchased bubbles in the
previous period, they are able to sell bubbles at the time they encounter H-
projects. As a result, their net worth increases (compared to the bubbleless
case) and boosts their investments, that is, the "wealth e⁄ect" works.8 H-H
entrepreneurs, however, are not able to take advantage of this merit, because
they did not buy bubbles in the previous period.
For those entrepreneurs who have L-projects at date t, they buy bubble






where i 2 Lt:
Next, we describe the aggregate economy. When we aggregate the invest-
ment function of each H-entrepreneur; we obtain the aggregate investment






On the other hand, when we aggregate the bubbles￿demand function of
each L-entrepreneur, we get the aggregate demand function for bubble assets
at date t:
8In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the rise in land price increases the entrepreneurs￿net
worth, which results in increasing investment. In this paper, bubbles play a similar role
as the land in Kiyotaki and Moore￿ s paper. Also this wealth e⁄ect is simillar to balance












where X is the aggregate quantity of bubbles, which is exogenously ￿xed.
The left hand side of (16) is the aggregate supply of bubble assets, and the
right hand side is the aggregate demand of them.
Next, we consider how the aggregate net worth of H-and L-entrepreneurs
evolves. The aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs in the bubble economy











t + PtX); (17)
where qtK￿
t +PtX is the aggregate wealth of the entrepreneurs in the bubble
economy: The ￿rst term in equation (17) is the aggregate net worth of H-H
entrepreneurs and the second term represents the one of L-H entrepreneurs:
(17) suggests that a fraction p of the aggregate wealth of the entrepreneurs
is the aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs.












t + PtX): (18)
We see that a fraction 1￿p of the aggregate wealth of the entrepreneurs
is the aggregate net worth of L-entrepreneurs.
From (16) and (18), we can derive the per unit price of bubble assets as
a function of the aggregate capital stock:
PtX =
￿(1 ￿ p)






We observe that the price of bubble assets at date t is an increasing
function of the aggregate capital stock at date t:






















t + PtX): (20)
By substituting (19) into (20), we can derive the law of motion of the
















From (21), there is a unique stationary equilibrium of the bubble economy.








And then, from (5), once K￿ is determined, we obtain the relative price
of capital to consumption goods, and the wage rate:
q
￿ =




￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(
￿￿H￿p




3.1 Existence Condition of Bubbles
In this subsection, we examine the existence condition of bubbles. For the
existence of bubbles at the steady-state economy, the following conditions
must be satis￿ed. First, the growth rate of bubbles (in this model, that is
Pt+1=Pt) must be equal or lower than the economic growth rate (in this model,
that is 1) since this economy cannot sustain the bubbles if the growth rate
of bubbles is higher that the economic growth rate. Moreover, if the growth
rate of bubbles is strictly lower than the economic growth rate, the economy
converges to the asymptotically bubbleless economy. Hence, as usual, we
focus on the case where the growth rate of bubbles is equal to the economic
growth rate. Second, in order that the L-entrepreneurs are willing to buy
bubbles, the equilibrium rate of return on bubbles must not be lower than










The left hand side is the rate of return on L-projects at the steady state, and
the right hand side is the one on bubbles. We can solve for ￿H
￿L; and get the
following condition:
￿H




As long as the above condition is satis￿ed, L-entrepreneurs are willing to buy
bubbles in equilibrium instead of investing in their L-projects. This is the
necessary condition for the existence of bubbles.9 Here we summarize the
result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Bubbles can exist as long as ￿H
￿L satis￿es the following con-
dition,
￿H




We can verify here that H-entrepreneurs never buy bubbles. To verify
this, we need to check that the rate of return on H-projects is strictly greater
than the rate of return on bubbles at the steady state. We know that the
rate of return on H-projects at the steady state is q￿￿H; while the rate of
return on bubbles is 1: It is obvious that q￿￿H = 1 +
1￿￿
￿p > 1:10
From this proposition, we can understand that bubbles are likely to exist
when the di⁄erence in the marginal productivity between H-projects and
9The reason this condition is called "necessary condition for the existence of bubbles"
is that unless people expect to be able to pass bubbles on to other people, bubbles cannot
arise in the economy. This expectation is the su¢ cient condition for the existence of
bubbles. Here, we assume that the condition is satis￿ed when bubbles appear.
10Here we verify that the short sale constraint is binding for the workers in the neigh-
borhood of the steady state. The constraint binds if and only if marginal utility of con-





















steady-state equilibrium, the inequality condition is equivalent to 1 > ￿; which is true.
By continuity, this holds in the neighborhood of the steady state.
14L-projects is large, the possibility of ￿nding high productive investments is
high, or the entrepreneurs are more patient.
Moreover, we can use the structure of the bubbleless economy to charac-
terize the existence condition. The existence condition of the bubbles is that
the growth rate, which is equal to one, is not lower than the rate of return on
L-projects under the bubbleless economy. That is, q￿L = ￿L
[￿Hp+￿L(1￿p)]￿ ￿ 1:
This condition is equivalent to ￿H
￿L ￿ 1 +
1￿￿
￿p :
Proposition 2 The necessary condition for the existence of bubbles is that
the equilibrium growth rate is not lower than the equilibrium rate of return
on L-projects under the bubbleless economy.
3.2 Macroeconomic E⁄ects of Asset Bubbles
In this section, we examine how bubbles a⁄ect macroeconomic variables.
We will show here that if the existence condition of bubbles is satis￿ed,
bubbles are expansionary, i.e., bubbles increase the aggregate capital stock,
the aggregate production level, the aggregate consumption level, and the
wage rate. We summarize the result in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 If the existence condition of bubbles is satis￿ed, the aggre-
gate capital stock, the aggregate production level, and the wage rate under the
bubble economy are all higher than that under the bubbleless economy at each
period.
Proof. The condition that the aggregate capital stock under the bubble econ-




1 ￿ ￿ + p￿
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1















Since the aggregate production level and the wage rate are increasing func-
tions of the aggregate capital stock, they are higher in the bubble economy
compared to the bubbleless economy.
15Here we explain an intuitive reason of this result. De￿ning A￿ ￿ q￿K￿ +














The second term in equation (22) implies that a fraction 1 ￿ p of the
aggregate savings of the entrepreneurs ￿ ows to bubble assets, which crowds
H-projects, resulting in a decrease in the aggregate capital stock.
More precisely, the di⁄erence in the aggregate capital stock between the
bubble economy and the bubbleless economy can be written as follows.
K
























Here, we will give intuitive explanations on the role of bubbles in al-
locating resources. In the bubbleless economy, since the credit market is
shut down, it is impossible to transfer resources from L-entrepreneurs to
H-entrepreneurs. However, in the bubble economy, all the savings of L-
entrepreneurs can be transferred to H-entrepreneurs through the transaction
of bubbles, even if the credit market is completely shut down. Bubbles com-
plement the credit market. Moreover, bubbles improve e¢ ciency in produc-
tion by eliminating low-productive investments.
The ￿rst term in equation (24) is a saving volume e⁄ect. In other words,
bubbles increase the aggregate savings of the economy, which improves the
aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs. This expands high productive in-
vestments. The second term is a saving composition e⁄ect. For L-H en-
trepreneurs, they sell bubble assets to L-entrepreneurs. As a result, all the
savings of L-entrepreneurs are transferred to H-entrepreneurs. These two ef-
fects generate a crowd-in e⁄ect on the aggregate capital stock, which in turn
increases the aggregate production level, and the wage rate. On the other
hand, there is a third e⁄ect, i.e., a traditional crowding-out e⁄ect, which is
the third term in equation (24). Depending on which one of these compet-
ing e⁄ects dominates, the e⁄ect of bubbles on the aggregate capital stock
is determined. Proposition 3 shows us that the crowd-in e⁄ect dominates
the crowd-out e⁄ect. Therefore, bubbles are expansionary. Note that the
16aggregate consumption level for the entrepreneurs, which is a fraction 1 ￿ ￿
of the aggregate wealth of the entrepreneurs, and for the workers expands,
because the aggregate wealth and the wage rate increase.
4 Stochastic Bubbles
In this section, we analyze the e⁄ects of bubbles￿bursting on the economy.
In order to do so, we consider stochastic bubbles.11 Here we assume the
following Markov chain:
Pr(Pt > 0 j Pt￿1 > 0) = ￿;
Pr(Pt > 0 j Pt￿1 = 0) = 0:
This chain implies that bubbles continue with probability ￿(< 1); and
their prices are positive until they switch to being equal to zero forever.
Let ￿￿ represents the case of the stochastic bubble economy. Here we
focus on the case where all macroeconomic variables are constant. As in
the previous case, H-entrepreneurs act much like they do in the deterministic
bubbly steady-state. They consume a fraction 1￿￿ of the net worth at every
period, and they invest a fraction ￿ of the net worth in their H-projects.
L-entrepreneurs also consume a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the net worth at every
period, but their portfolio problem is more complicated than in the deter-
ministic bubbly steady-state. Since bubble assets deliver no return with
probability ￿, hence, L-entrepreneurs want to hedge themselves by investing
some of their savings in their L-projects.
More speci￿cally, L-entrepreneurs invest ￿￿E￿￿L
t in their L-projects, and
they also buy bubble assets with (1￿￿)￿E￿￿L
t : Here, ￿ satis￿es the ￿rst-order
condition:
￿(1 ￿ q￿￿￿L)








1 ￿ q￿￿￿L; and 1 ￿ ￿ =
￿ ￿ q￿￿￿L
1 ￿ q￿￿￿L:
11Weil (1987) is the ￿rst study which considers stochastic bubbles in a general equilib-
rium framework.








L 1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ q￿￿￿L￿(1 ￿ p)A
￿￿ +
￿ ￿ q￿￿￿L
1 ￿ q￿￿￿L￿(1 ￿ p)A
￿￿:
(25)
(25) suggests that the aggregate wealth is composed of three parts. The
￿rst term of the right hand side in equation (25) represents the returns from
H-projects. The second and the third terms represent the returns from L-
projects and the ones from bubble assets. Note that the rate of return on
bubbles is equal to one.
Hence, we can solve for q￿￿:
q
￿￿ =
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)￿
￿H￿p
:











￿￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿￿H￿p




We should remember that unlike in the deterministic bubbly steady-state,
L-entrepreneurs are investing some of their savings in low productive invest-
ments.
4.1 Existence Condition of Stochastic Bubbles
In this subsection, we investigate the existence of stochastic bubbles. The
following condition must be satis￿ed in order that stochastic bubbles can
exist in the equilibrium path where all variables become constant. The share
of L-projects against the aggregate net worth of L-entrepreneurs must be
strictly less than one, which is equivalent to the condition that the share of
bubbles against the aggregate net worth of L-entrepreneurs must be strictly
positive. In other words,
18￿ =
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ q￿￿￿L < 1:
From this condition, we obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 As long as ￿H
￿L satis￿es the following condition, stochastic
bubbles can exist in the equilibrium where all variables are constant.
￿H




We see that compared to the deterministic bubbles, the existence condi-
tion gets tightened.
4.2 Macroeconomic E⁄ects of Stochastic Bubbles
In this subsection, we examine how stochastic bubbles a⁄ect macroeconomic
variables. We summarize the results in the following Propositions.
Proposition 5 If the existence condition of stochastic bubbles is satis￿ed,
the aggregate capital stock, the aggregate production level, and the wage rate
under the stochastic bubble economy are all strictly higher than that under
the bubbleless economy at each period.
Proof. The condition that the aggregate capital stock under the stochastic























Since the aggregate production level and the wage rate are increasing func-
tions of the aggregate capital stock, they are higher in the stochastic bubble
economy compared to the bubbleless economy.
19Proposition 6 The aggregate capital stock, the aggregate production level,
and the wage rate under the stochastic bubble economy are all strictly lower
than that under the deterministic bubble economy at each period.
Proof. If we compare K to K￿￿; it is obvious that K￿￿ is strictly lower than
K as long as ￿ < 1:
4.3 Bubble Bursts
Now, we are ready to discuss how bubbles￿bursting a⁄ects the economy.
Suppose that until date s ￿ 1; bubbles continue, and then, at date s; they
collapse. The entrepreneurs who did not buy bubble assets at date s ￿ 1
(H-entrepreneurs at date s ￿ 1) are una⁄ected by the bubbles collapse, but
the entrepreneurs who bought bubbles at date s ￿ 1 (L-entrepreneurs at
date s ￿ 1) realize that they cannot sell the bubbles suddenly: As a result,
the aggregate wealth of the entrepreneurs decreases. Hence, the aggregate
consumption level of the entrepreneurs at date s also falls. Recall that the
aggregate consumption is a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the aggregate wealth.
Despite the immediate impact on the entrepreneurs￿consumption level,
there is no immediate impact on the aggregate output level and the wage
rate at date s; because the aggregate capital stock at date s is pinned down
by the investments at date s￿1. However, at date s+1; all macroeconomic











Along the new path, the economy transits to a new, lower, steady-state
level.
The interesting point is that until date s ￿ 1, some of the savings of L-
entrepreneurs are transferred to H-entrepreneurs through bubbles, but once
the economy is hit by the bubbles collapse at date s, it suddenly becomes
impossible to transfer resources from L-entrepreneurs to H-entrepreneurs. L-
H entrepreneurs from date s ￿ 1 to date s are forced to cut back on their
investment, because they cannot sell the bubbles to L-entrepreneurs and as
a result, their net worth decreases. This results in producing negative am-
pli￿cation e⁄ects on the aggregate investment of H-entrepreneurs at date s.
20Moreover, the bubbles burst has a persistent e⁄ect on the aggregate vari-
ables. Figure 1 depicts the movement of the aggregate output before and
after the bubbles￿bursting.
4.4 Government Policy After Bubbles Collapse
As we discussed in the previous section, the collapse of the bubbles triggers a
fall in all macroeconomic variables. The question is what can the government
do to restore the economy?
In the model economy, the bubbles are useful because they provide a store
of value whose rate of return is high. This high rate of return improves the
entrepreneurs￿net worth, which increases the investment of H-entrepreneurs
and the aggregate output. Once the bubbles burst, there is no such a store
of value, and the entrepreneurs have to reduce their investment. To help the
economy, the government needs to provide another form of assets as a store
of value into the economy.
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) and Kocherlakota (2009) contem-
plate government debt as a store of value. They consider a policy that the
government re-￿nances existing debt simply by rolling over it. In the case
of bubbles, bubbles are not backed, and they simply depend upon the self-
ful￿lling beliefs of private agents. However, government debt is backed by
taxes. If the government cannot roll over its debt, it can levy taxes on agents,
and repay its debt.12 The government debt is fundamentally di⁄erent from
bubble assets. Hence, we can think of such a government debt as a deter-
ministic bubble asset.
Here we consider the e⁄ect of this policy. As before, suppose that at date
s; the bubbles burst and then, at date s + ￿(￿ ￿ 0); the government hands
out government bonds to entrepreneurs. The distribution of this handout
across the entrepreneurs is irrelevant. After date s + ￿ + 1; the government
simply rolls over the debt.
Because of this policy, the dynamics of the aggregate capital stock is
governed by the following equation:
12Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) and Kocherlakota (2009) argue that, in equilib-
rium, the government will never need to collect the taxes. Instead, the government can
commit to a strategy under which it commits to rolling over the existing debt, and then
levies taxes if agents fail to buy the issued debt.
21Ks+￿+1 =
￿￿H￿p




After date s+￿ +1; the economy rides on a new transitory path, which is
exactly the same as the path in the deterministic bubble economy, and con-
verges to a new, higher, steady-state level. Figure 2 describes the movement
of the aggregate output after this policy.13
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that even if the quality of ￿nancial institu-
tion is very poor and credit market does not work at all, bubbles have a
positive role for enhancing the e¢ ciency of investments. In the bubble econ-
omy, all savings of entrepreneurs who have only less productive investment
opportunities can be transferred to the entrepreneurs who have high produc-
tive investment opportunities by trading asset bubbles. As a result, bubbles
improve e¢ ciency in production by eliminating low-productive investments.
This implies that bubble bursts results in productive ine¢ ciency.
For this mechanism, the transition of investment opportunities is crucial.
The agent who sell bubbles is the entrepreneur who did not have a good
investment opportunity and purchased bubbles in the previous period but has
a good investment opportunity now. Such agent gets the fund for the good
investment by selling the purchased bubbles. On the other hand, the agent
who lost a good investment opportunity becomes a buyer of the bubbles. By
investing to the bubbles instead to a low productive investment, she prepare
a good investment opportunity in the future.
In this sense, bubbles and ￿nancial institution is substitutes as long as the
transition of investment opportunity is satis￿ed. If bubbles burst, however,
the economy should go down as explored in the previous section. Thus,
bubbles and ￿nancial institution are not perfect substitutes.
In order to avoid the crash risk, we have explained the possibility that
government intervenes by issuing government bond, since government bond
works almost similar to asset bubbles, Another possible policy is directly im-
proving the quality of ￿nancial institution. When the mechanism by bubbles
13Note that the interest rate on the government bonds at the new steady state as well
as on the transitory path is equal to the rate of return on deterministic bubble assets
analyzed in section 2.
22work well, there might be no incentive to improve the quality of ￿nancial
institution. However, the result of this paper implies that it is important to
improving the quality of ￿nancial institution before bursting of bubbles. If
the quality is high and credit market works well, even if bubbles burst, the
resource can be transferred to the high productive investments and economy
does not go down. Hence, it is important to improving the quality of ￿nancial
market for the stability of macro performance.
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Figure 2: Output movement after government policy
Y** Recovery period
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